Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic situations (finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, communication between agents, and spatial interactions) require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. Here we discuss the use of agent-based methods in evolutionary game theory and contrast standard results to those obtainable by a mathematical treatment. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread, but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is an application of the mathematical framework of game theory [1] to the dynamics of animal conflicts (including, of course, the conflicts people engage in). In game theory, the object is to find an appropriate strategy to resolve arising conflicts, or alternatively to find the optimal sequence of decisions that leads to the highest payoff. Even though game theory has been influential in economics and finance, perhaps its most well-known application has been in the life sciences. Beginning with the seminal paper by Maynard Smith and Price [2] , Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) has burgeoned into a mainstay of mathematical and computational biology (see, e.g., these textbooks and monographs [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] ).
The mathematical foundations of game theory (extended, for example, by Nash [9] ) experienced a revival when Maynard Smith and Price turned their attention to EGT. Maynard Smith coined the term "Evolutionary Stable Strategy" (ESS), to mean a move (or play) that
Box 1: Payoff Matrices and Stability
The outcome of evolutionary games is in large part determined by the payoff that accumulates between two players with different strategies. In the simplest case, the strategies are unconditional and deterministic: they only depend on the genes of the player, but not on the genes (or the phenotype, that is, the actions) of the opponent. If there are only two such plays/genes, then the payoff matrix can be rendered as a 2 × 2 matrix, where each element of the matrix is the payoff to the row player, that is, the strategy "on the left" (rather than "on top") of the matrix. If we label the plays 'C' and 'D', then the most general 2 × 2 game is defined by the matrix
It turns out that for infinite well-mixed populations, the outcome of the game is invariant upon adding or subtracting a constant to any column of the game (this holds also for games with more than two strategies). In that case, the game only depends on two constants:
It is furthermore easy to determine that there are only four different kinds of matricesgiving rise to four different classes of games (Zeeman classes)-which are given by the relative sign of the two constants a and b [7, 10, 13, 14] . They are Prisoner's Dilemma (a < 0, b > 0), Snowdrift game (a > 0, b > 0), Anti-coordination game (a < 0, b < 0), and Harmony (a > 0, b < 0). For games with three strategies, there are 39 different Zeeman classes [10] . If strategies are probabilistic rather than deterministic (an agent engages in play C with probability p), the theoretical phase portraits (a geometric representation of the set of fixed points, as well as the trajectories between them) carry over unchanged from a representation in terms of population fractions (deterministic play) to probabilities, except that some unstable fixed points will convert to stable ones for games with more than two players [14] .
However, real populations are never infinite. Nor are they ever perfectly well-mixed. But these are only the obvious limitations. There are yet more limitations of the mathematics of game theory of perhaps greater importance. For example, it goes without saying that decisions are not always deterministic, and can also be influenced by the memory of previous encounters. But chief among the limitations probably is this: When strategies compete in an evolutionary scenario, it is unthinkable that all possible strategies compete against each other at one precise point in time. Rather, the strategies that do compete are those that are around at this one particular period in time, and the set of strategies that compete changes over time.
New strategies emerge to test their mettle with the established ones, while once-dominant strategies can be forced to extinction by a newcomer. The success of a strategy, therefore, should be determined in the context of the strategies that it is exposed to, in space as well as in time.
What is described by the scenario where all existing strategies battle it out with each other is what is otherwise known as microevolution, that is, the dynamics engendered by the change of existing allele frequencies based on their relative fitnesses in the population. Strictly (and technically) speaking, this is a zero-mutation rate approximation of evolutionary theory, and the large-scale statistics associated with this process are well described by the "first term" of the Price equation [15] (applied to fitness as the trait under selection), also known as Fisher's Fundamental Theorem [16, 17] .
It goes without saying that micro-evolutionary dynamics is not un-interesting. However, on a broader scale of evolutionary dynamics, we are interested in the emergence of novel alleles that the population has never experienced before, how these alleles fare against the established ones, and which alleles go to extinction as a consequence of the emergence of new types (and other evolutionary forces). In other words, what is often perceived as most interesting on an evolutionary scale is the emergence of complexity when there was none before; how evolution can give rise to refined answers to seemingly intractable morphological or metabolic problems, with often highly creative solutions. Because changing environments in particular often require novel alleles for survival (in these changed conditions), a restriction to existing variation does not do justice to the fundamental creative power of the evolutionary process. An EGT that focuses on existing variation in our view therefore does not merit the 'E' in EGT. We will argue here that it takes agent-based simulation methods in a game-theoretic framework to put the 'E' back into EGT, and that failing to do so can obscure many important (perhaps even the most important) aspects of the evolution of cooperation.
Arguably, the majority of the literature in EGT is mathematical in nature, with simulations either used to validate the mathematical arguments, or else to investigate limits in which the mathematics is known to fail. We cannot here do justice to all this literature, and often refer instead to a number of excellent textbooks or reviews (see, e.g., [13] for a comprehensive review of the literature covering non-heterogeneous populations). Instead, we choose here to highlight the elements of evolutionary game dynamics that cause the failure of mathematics (in the sense that mathematics is unable to provide closed-form solutions) and argue that agent-based simulations provide a means to move beyond mathematics [18] , without loss of rigor, but with a significant gain in predictive power.
Agent-based methods

Limitations due to finite population size
Finite populations make the mathematical solution of game theoretic dilemmas more difficult, but not impossible. In infinite populations, when using the payoff matrix (2) the fraction of the population of type C is determined by the ordinary differential equation (the replicator equation)ẋ
where the density of defectors is x D (t) = 1 − x C (t). If populations are not infinite, then the replicator equation approach will not correctly predict the population outcome anymore. A typical example among three-strategy games is the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, one of the 19 possible three-strategy games described by Zeeman [10] . A typical normalized payoff matrix for this game (with internal fixed point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), that is, equal population fraction for all strategies) is given by
This fixed point, however, is unstable: the trajectories push outward from the central point, and soon enough the population (in the infinite population approximation) moves from all scissors, to all rock, to all paper (a trajectory known as a heteroclinic orbit because it connects the unstable pure strategy fixed points, see Fig. 1A ). This is impossible for a finite population, however. In these, once a type is extinct it will not return (see Fig. 1B ). In finite populations playing the same game (defined by the payoffs (4)) only a single strategy will survive, but which one remains depends on initial conditions. Note that extinction can happen due to the stochasticity introduced by the finite population even for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game with an attractive interior fixed point (obtained from Eq. (4) by replacing every -2 with a 2) [14, 19] .
We do not mean to imply here that no results can be obtained analytically for finite populations-quite to the contrary (see, e.g., [20] for a comprehensive review). For example, it is possible to calculate the probability that a particular strategy can invade an existing (clonal) population, as a function of the size of the invading "clan", for arbitrary 2 × 2 games, that is, games between two strategies defined by payoff matrices of the type (2). In certain limits (for example, very small mutation rates and a pre-defined set of strategies as discussed below), the finite-population dynamics can be described by a Markov process that describes the transition probability between each strategy. The population trajectories can then be obtained by simply iterating the Markov matrix, and the fixed point can be obtained by calculating the (right) eigenvector of the Markov matrix (see, e.g., [20, 21] ). Thus, finite populations in itself are not by themselves a reason to abandon mathematics in favor of agentbased simulations. But as we will see, when finite populations are coupled with a number of other realistic aspects of evolving populations, agent-based simulations are essential in order to understand the evolutionary fate of populations that play games.
Mutations
If mutations constantly produce new strategies, analytical methods must fail because they cannot keep track of the persistent production of novelty. In the previous section, we studied finite populations using agent-based modeling, but strategies were not mutating. The game dynamics simply determines which strategy (or set of strategies) should survive, changing the frequencies x i accordingly. But in Darwinian evolution strategies can change via random mutations, and we can implement this process in our agent-based simulations. If mutations are possible, the replicator equations (for the case of infinite populations) have to be replaced by the replicator-mutator equations: this is Eigen's quasi species model [22, 23] . Unfortunately, Eigen's model is only exactly solvable for very specific fitness landscapes and mutation processes. However, in the limit of small mutation rates and a finite population size the evolutionary dynamics can (as we mentioned above) be described by a Markov process whose stationary distribution can be calculated exactly [20] .
In case there are only a few possible strategies, the effect of mutations mainly modifies the finite-population effect, where (in the absence of mutation) strategies can go permanently extinct. Mutations can resurrect strategies that went to extinction, which could be advantageous for the population if payoffs (dictated by the environment, for example) change. In this case (just a few possible strategies), the effect of mutations can be simulated by simply introducing a constant (but small) rate of strategy influx that ensures each of the strategies is re-introduced into the population (see, e.g. [21] In the limit of a large (or even infinite) set of possible strategies, it is not possible to create a constant flux of all strategies into the population, neither would that be desirable. In a realistic finite population at a finite mutation rate, only a tiny subset of all possible strategies ever exists at the same time, and only those strategies that are mutations of the existing set can enter the population. Because the existing set ever changes (due to extinctions and the emergence of new strategies), the set of mutant types also constantly changes. In such a setting, strategies that become extinct are unlikely to be resurrected, and as a consequence the population is dynamic and continues to explores strategy space. Such an evolutionary dynamic can only be implemented by providing a genetic basis for each strategy, so that the mutations of the genes create progeny whose strategy will be similar to that of their ancestors. This is the basis of agent-based simulation in evolutionary game theory.
In evolutionary theory, it is customary to distinguish two different adaptive regimes, dictated to a large extent by the mutation rate. If the mutation rate is so low that it is unlikely that more than two variants ever coexist in a population (this happens when the mutation supply rate, given by the product of population size and mutation rate is significantly smaller than 1) then the evolutionary history of a population can be described by a sequence of substitutions that each went to fixation individually, in a homogeneous background, and as discussed before, the probability of any one strategy to go to fixation can be described analytically if there are only a handful of strategies (typically two, see [20] ).
The other extreme of evolutionary dynamics is the "strong mutation-weak selection limit", where multiple variants are coexisting in the populations and where the standard mathematical theory of fixation of beneficial mutants [24] does not apply. While often a rule of thumb to separate these two regimes is simply N µ ∼ 1 (that is, one new mutation enters the population per generation) a more conservative limiting value is µN ≈ 1/N [20] . If we take the latter estimate seriously then agent-based methods would become important in order to capture evolutionary dynamics as long as µ > 1/N 2 . For bacterial populations, the per-site mutation rate is of the order 10 −10 per nucleotide [25] , translating to a per-genome mutation rate (for E. coli bacteria) of about 4 × 10 −4 , that is, only 4 out of 10,000 bacteria produced carry at least one mutation. This seems quite low, until you realize that typical bacterial populations are of the order of 10 6 − 10 8 . In that case, the mutation supply rate µN ∼ 20, 000 in Lenski's experiment. So, even bacterial populations are deep in the "strong mutation-weak selection limit".
Stochastic strategies
If we think about real agents making decisions in an uncertain world (be it microbes or day traders), it is the rarest individual who makes decisions deterministically. More often than not, an agent is described by a probability to make a decision. In games with two strategies, Maynard Smith showed that for a game with an attractive interior fixed point (a snowdrift game with a, b > 0) a probabilistic strategy is ESS with probabilities given by the equilibrium population fractions [3] . However, this general result does not translate to games with more than two strategies. While the fixed point for stochastic strategies will always coincide with the mixed strategy ESS (the stable population fraction of pure strategies), there is no general theory that predicts the stability of said fixed point [26] [27] [28] [29] . We can see this readily by analyzing a three-player game that is general enough to include the standard Rock-Paper-Scissors game (both with an attractive and a repulsive fixed point), and a number of other three-player games classified by Zeeman [10] .
The "Suicide Bomber" (SB) game is modeled after the dynamics of bacterial populations in which a small fraction of bacteria commit suicide by triggering an explosion that sprays a bacterial toxin into the surrounding area. While the exploding bacterium is killed, its kin (who carry a resistance gene to the toxin) profit from the suicide, because it removes non-kin bacteria from the food source as those do not carry the resistance gene [30] [31] [32] . But the dynamics is complicated: the wild-type strain "00" that carries neither the toxin gene T nor the resistance gene R will be outcompeted by the suicide bomber "RT" strain, because of the advantage that explosion confers on the bomber's kin. However, RT carries a double disadvantage compared to the wild-type that does not carry either gene, because toxin production and resistance are both costly. The RT strain, as a consequence, can be invaded by a strain that has lost the toxin production gene (a strain "R0"), because it is a cheater that does not suffer from toxin exposure yet does not pay the cost of carrying the toxin. Once R0 dominates the population, it can be invaded by a wild-type 00, because in the absence of toxin production, carrying the resistance gene is a useless luxury. Of course, once 00 dominates, it is again vulnerable to invasion by RT, and the cycle resumes in what seems like a never-ending game of Rock-Paper-Scissors.
Stochastic strategies can be stable even if the corresponding mixed state is unstable. A quantitative analysis reveals a subtle dependence of the game dynamics on the relative size of the costs and benefits of the R and T gene [14] , revealing that the game dynamics can belong to one of seven of Zeeman's 19 possible three-strategy games. In particular, the fixed point of the RPS game can be either attractive or repulsive. In Fig. 2 below, we show the phase portrait of the SB game for the repulsive RPS game (ω < ε, ε < 1, see the payoff matric for this game in Box 2), using deterministic strategies and an infinite population (solved using the replicator equation) on the left, and using agent-based simulations of stochastic strategies on the right. On the left diagram, each point on the trajectory represents a set of population fractions (the mixed state), while for the agent-based simulation on the right, the trajectory represents an (average) line of descent of the probabilities to engage in the three different plays. We observe that the trajectory on the left spirals outwards, away from the repulsive fixed point indicated by the yellow arrow, while on the right, the trajectory moves towards the fixed point (even though it does not appear to quite reach it). Thus, a repulsive fixed point for deterministic mixed strategies has turned into an attractive fixed point for stochastic strategies, while the location of the fixed point appears to be unchanged. 
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Box 2: Suicide Bomber game
In this game, three strategies 00 (the "wild-type"), RT (the bomber), and R0 (the cheater) battle against each other, with dynamics dictated by the relative value of the benefit ε and the cost ω (we assume here an equal cost for both the toxin and the resistance gene). A fourth possible strategy (0T) is not viable, because carrying the toxin gene without resistance to it is generally a bad strategy. The payoff matrix is given by
The seven possible games that exist for this payoff matrix can be described by phase portraits that sketch the expected population trajectories. Figure 3 : Phase portraits of stable dynamics for the SB game using payoffs (5) . The shaded parameter region ω < ε/(ε + 1) has an interior fixed point that can be repulsive or attractive. In Zeeman's phase portrait pictograms [10] , arrows denote the flow on the boundary of the simplex, solid circles are attractors and open circles are repellers. All fixed points on the boundary and the interior are indicated. Modified from [14] .
Conditional strategies
In the previous sections, we considered strategies that made decisions unilaterally. In more realistic situations, agents prefer to make informed decisions, meaning that they will utilize external clues to modulate their decisions. Strategies that take information into account are called "conditional strategies", because the agent's move is conditional on a symbol that they obtain. Generally speaking, agents that make informed decisions are agents that are communicating (even though this communication is not required to be two-way: receiving information is also termed communication here). The quintessential conditional strategy (because of the sheer amount of literature devoted to it) is a strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, called "Tit-for-Tat" (TfT). This strategy will cooperate if the opponent cooperated in the previous move, and will defect if that is what the opponent just did. Thus, it does as the name of the strategy suggests. We can describe a strategy in terms of conditional probabilities that take the past move of the opponent as well as the past move of self into account as 1 P = (p(C|CC), p(C|CD), p(C|DC), p(C|DD)) .
In terms of these probabilities, the strategy TfT is P TfT = (1, 1, 0, 0) . Of course, TfT is not a probabilistic strategy, nor does its actions depend on its own past moves, but we introduced this notation so as to be able to discuss the more general stochastic "memory-one" strategies, introduced by Nowak and Sigmund [33, 34] . The dynamics of this infinite set of strategies cannot be described in its entirety purely mathematically, simply because the mathematical calculation of optimal strategies is just too difficult (for an example, see [35] ). If mathematical methods will not tell us which stochastic memory-one strategy is favored by evolution, agent-based methods are there to tell the story. The answer to this question is: "It depends". By using an approach where the four probabilities (6) (supplemented by a probability that decides the first unconditional move in an encounter) are encoded genetically, Iliopoulos et al. [36] showed that the strategy that ultimately dominates the population depends on the environment. For example, high mutation rates favor strategies that defect, because the high rate of mutation tends to modify the opponent and thus make it a less reliable adversary. Similarly, if the population turns over quickly because a large fraction of players is replaced at each generation, any one player cannot rely on playing the same opponent, and opt instead to defect. What is seen then is a phase transition between cooperative and defective behavior that is driven by the mutation rate or the replacement rate. High mutation rate and high replacement rate create high uncertainty about the opponent, and results in a cautious population that favors defection.
Significant mathematical progress in elucidating the structure of stochastic memory-one strategies was made recently, when Press and Dyson discovered that a subset of these strategies was able to take advantage of their opponents [37] . Even though this subset had been mentioned in the literature before [38] , this discovery highlighted that the set of stochastic memory-one strategies is far from being fully understood.
Press and Dyson discovered a set of conditional strategies that communicated with their opponents in a nefarious manner: they used the opponent's choices in such a manner that the opponent is guaranteed a fixed payoff (in most cases, a payoff lower than what ZD receives). Indeed, the fixed payoff is guaranteed no matter which strategy the opponent chooses: against a ZD strategy, the opponent obtains (in the limit of a large number of plays) a payoff that he cannot control. It is not easy to see how such a strategy can be be possible, but the mathematics is borne out by the simulations: in direct clashes, the ZD players wins against most other strategies (but not all of them: playing All-D is a good defense against ZD, because while All-D's payoff is fixed by ZD, it actually exceeds what ZD receives).
However, the payoffs between opposing players does not determine the fate of populations, because in well-mixed populations of both types, agents must play their kin as often as they play a different type. Thus, a successful strategy must play nicely against their own kind, which ZD does not do because they fix the opponent's payoff regardless what their strategy is. Thus, ZD not only rips off others, it also rips off ZD. An agent-based simulation at zero mutation rate reveals immediately that ZD is not stable against a variety of opponents [35] . Most damning for ZD is its fate against the strategy Pavlov, defined by the strategy vector P Pav = (1, 0, 0, 1) . Even though ZD wins each and every single encounter with Pavlov, it will quickly be driven to extinction because Pavlov cooperates with its kin, while ZD treats its own kind like it treats everybody.
Another test of stability is to ask what happens to ZD if it is allowed to mutate. We can answer this question using a full agent-based simulation as described in [36] , but where we take as the initial state a population of identical ZD strategists. We find that the strategy is gradually replaced by less coercive strategies, ultimately coalescing to a generous strategy GC (the "general cooperator") that was described by Iliopoulos et al. [36] . Strategies of this type (exemplified by P GC ≈ (0.94, 0.23, 0.27, 0.42)) are robust and generous, and even more successful than the generous ZD strategies described by Hilbe et al. [39] and Stewart and Plotkin [40] .
Indeed, the full set of ZD strategies is larger than the set of "selfish" strategies discussed in [35, 37] , and contains generous strategies that-because they are generous to others as well as to their own kind-turn out to be evolutionarily successful after all [39, 40] . We learn from these investigations that fixing your opponent's payoff to be low (thus "bullying" your opponent) can be advantageous in the short run, but will ultimately lead to extinction. Fixing your opponent's payoff to be high, instead, will not only make you popular, but also help your survival in the long run. But to be really successful in an evolutionary setting, a strategy also has to be forgiving (a sizable probability to return to cooperation after mutual defection). Even generous ZD strategies cannot achieve this (contrary to what is claimed in [40] ), because their p 4 must be small.
Evolutionarily stable sets
Consider for a moment a two-player game described by the payoff matrix (2) in the "snowdrift" regime, where both a, b > 0. In that case, None of the "pure" strategies C or D are an ESS, but the mixed strategy M (a probabilistic mixture of the two strategies C and D) is, with frequencies a a+b and b a+b respectively. The mean payoff of strategy M against pure strategies C and D can be calculated, so we may ask: "What happens if we play the pure strategies C and D against another strategy that has the same payoffs of the mixed strategy?" For example, the mixed strategy M earns b 2 /(a + b) against C, and a 2 /(a + b) against D. What is the dynamics when a pure strategy with these exact payoffs is thrown "into the mix"? We can investigate this by studying the payoff matrix
which is easily deduced from the payoffs of M against C or D. Note that the M column could as well be zero, because subtracting a constant from every element does not change change the game dynamics, nor does subtracting a constant from each element in the same column.
It turns out that in such a game isolated fixed points turn into stable sets: M can be stable in the background of C and D at arbitrary frequencies, but given a particular frequency of M (say, r), the frequencies of C and D are fixed at a(1 − r)/(a + b) and b(1 − r)/(a + b) respectively.
Such Evolutionarily Stable Sets (ES sets) were first discussed by Thomas [41, 42] and are studied in detail by Weibull [5] . A deterministic strategy M with payoffs as defined in (7) will form ES sets, because it is neutral with respect to the other strategies (see Fig. 4 ). Along the neutral line in Fig. 4 , no one set of strategies is better than another, forming a ridge of attraction in the phase portrait. This analysis of ES sets did not require agent-based methods. But we could now go further and ask, what is the dynamics of a probabilistic strategy that can play either of the three strategies C, D, or M with probabilities p, q, and r? As discussed above, we expect the fixed point of the deterministic theory to predict the stable point of the probabilistic theory, which would imply that the entire dashed line in Fig. 4 should be fixed points of the probabilistic dynamics. The theory does not predict the stability of these points, but previous experience [14] suggests that they should be attractive.
When testing these predictions with agent-based methods 2 , several decisions in designing the simulation can have significant impact on the results. For example, because the probabilities p, q, and r are changed via a discrete mutational process, the nature of that process will affect the population dynamics. If the probabilities are implemented as continuous variables (rather than discretized to a particular resolution), we could mutate either by replacing the given probability by a uniform random number ("global" mutations), or we could change the probabilities either up or down by a uniform random number from a distribution spanning a particular percentage ("local" mutations). In the latter case, care must be taken so as to remain within the boundaries of a probability. At the same time, it is not possible to update all three probabilities independently, as they must sum to one. Thus, if we implement the underlying genetics of the process in terms of three loci (one for p, one for q, and one for r), then mutating one locus will necessarily affect both other loci (we refer to this implementation as the "3-gene" implementation). If we instead implement the genetics in terms of two independent loci (say, p and q, the "two-gene" implementation)), then the value of the third probability is determined automatically. It turns out that all these design decisions affect the population dynamics, as we will see.
In Fig. 5a , we show the average trajectory of the set of probabilities (p, q, r) on the evolutionary "line of descent" (see Box 3) . Note that only the average trajectory (averaged over 1,000 trials) starting at the same initial state (p(0), q(0), r(0)) is smooth: each single trajectory is jagged, because in this run, when probabilities are mutated they are changed at most ±5% from their current value, which can give rise to significant jumps within the triangle. As a consequence, the "end point" of the trajectory (after 1,000 generations) does not coincide exactly with a point on the ES-set, but can differ significantly from it. However, if we average these endpoints (while keeping the M-probability fixed), we recover the ES-set as seen in Fig. 5b .
(a) (b) (c) Figure 5 : (a): Averaged end points of 1,000 trajectories (averaged p and q, for slices with fixed r). End points are defined to be the most recent common ancestor of the population on the line of descent, usually this point is around generation 900 (of 1,000). Averaging the end points without fixing r leads to a single point, as the law of large numbers implies that the mean of the ES-set in the r-direction equals 0.5 (not shown). The payoff matrix in (7) has a = 1, b = 0.2. (b): Average trajectories of lines of descent for probabilistic strategies with different initial conditions, using the "3-genes" encoding (see text). The dashed line represents the predicted ES-set for deterministic strategies shown in Fig. 4 . Average of 1,000 trajectories per line of descent, obtained from populations with 1,024 agents evolving at a mutation rate of 10% per locus (translating to 20% per chromosome) for 1,000 generations. (c): Average trajectories of lines of descent for probabilistic strategies using an encoding where each of the two probabilities p and q is encoded independently, thus fixing r (the "2-genes" encoding).
We thus see that agent-based methods can also be used in game-theoretic problems with an ES-set. The trajectory of probabilities on the line of descent follows the population fractions of the pure strategy only approximately, something that we had also noticed for trajectories in a game with an isolated fixed point in Fig. 2 . We ought not to worry about this, however, as we recall that the theory of evolutionary stability of stochastic strategies [26] [27] [28] [29] only predicts the location of the fixed point, not its stability or the trajectory that game dynamics uses to reach the fixed point. But it is clear that the population dynamics in EGT must depend both on genotype-phenotype mappings as well as mutational mechanics, elements that are difficult to study using analytical methods.
It is interesting to note that different genetic encoding strategies result in different mutationinduced trajectories through the phase-portrait. This is because although both 2-gene and 3-gene encoding strategies have the same evolutionary pressure (selection gradient), they differ in the amount of gene-to-gene interaction (epistasis) as well as total effect on the final 3 probabilities. That is, a change in one of two interacting genes (b) alters the resulting three traits differently than a change in one of three loosely interacting genes producing the same traits (c) The selection gradient defined by the payoff matrix remains identical so both encoding strategies recover the ES-set.
Spatial interactions
If the interaction between players are local rather than global-meaning that players interact with their immediate neighbors in space (or more generally, on a lattice) rather than with randomly chosen opponents-agent-based methods are almost unavoidable. The importance of spatial assortment is immediately obvious. After all, the reason why cooperation is not a stable strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma (a staple of EGT described in more detail below) is because cooperators are vulnerable to defectors: when unconditional cooperators interact with defectors, they are "ripped off". But if cooperators (in the absence of mutations) give rise to other cooperators that are placed next to them, then the cooperators interact with defectors only rarely, namely they encounter them only on the boundary that separates groups of cooperators from groups of defectors. Because cooperators that play with cooperators have a higher fitness than defectors that interact with other defectors, spatial (as opposed to wellmixed) dynamics is much more conducive to the establishment of cooperation [44] [45] [46] . Note that this is not a universal feature of all games: in the Snowdrift game for example (a, b > 0 in Eq. (2)), spatial interactions can suppress cooperation [47] . Methods exist to predict levels of cooperation mathematically in spatial games via generalized mean-field calculations [13, 48, 49] or "pair-wise methods" [47] , but they are limited to games with few (usually only two) strategies, and are only approximations.
Box 3: Methods in Agent-based Simulations
In agent-based simulations, strategies are encoded within genes (sometimes called loci, genotype, or chromosome) and these genes are evolved using a Genetic Algorithm [50] . In the game-theoretic application discussed here, the genes are just sets of probabilities, one for each action that an agent can take. In an unconditional 2 × 2 game (two-player, two strategy game), a single gene encoding the probability to play C, for example, suffices. In a conditional 2 × 2 game, 5 genes are needed (four encoding the conditional moves and one for the first move of the player, which is unconditional). In a memory-2 game (where players can make their decision based on the previous two moves) we need to add another 16 loci, for a chromosome with 21 genes [36] ). Every one of the agents in the population plays a fixed number of games before the population is updated, and the payoff accumulates for each. In a well-mixed population, agents play opponents that are chosen at random from the population, while in a spatial simulation the agent plays its nearest neighbors on a grid. Typically, a fixed random fraction R of the population is then removed. This fraction can range from removing a single player (R = 1/N , where N is the population size) only in a procedure called the death-birth Moran process [51] , to removing the entire population (R = 1)-this is called the Wright-Fischer process for asexual haploids [52] . The fraction of the population that is removed each update determines the number of games in which each player engages during their lifetime, and therefore plays an important role in the population dynamics. As R is the fraction removed each update, the inverse 1/R determines the average number of updates for each individual, and since the number of games per update is constant, 1/R determines the average number of games each individual plays before they are removed. Sometimes, a "strategy imitation" mechanism is used for selection, where strategy i receiving payoff E i is replaced with probability P i→j = (1 + exp(E i − E j )/K) −1 , where E j is the payoff of any of the opponents, and K is a measure of noise (see, e.g., [13] ). Even though such an imitation mechanism is not strictly Darwinian, the resulting dynamics are very similar. If random players are removed, selection must occur on the birth process, and indeed the number of offspring each strategy receives is determined by its ranking or the relative fitness. After the population is filled-up back to its original size after culling, mutations are applied to the chromosomes based on the prevailing mutation rate. Because mutations are Poisson-random, the probability that a genome suffers n mutations is given by the Poisson distribution P (n) = λ n e −λ /n! where λ is the mutation rate (mean number of mutations per chromosome per update). Note that if the mutation rate per locus is µ, the per-chromosome mutation rate is λ = µL, where L is the number of loci or genes. In order to track the evolution of the chromosome, we can reconstruct the ancestral line of descent (LOD) of a population by picking a dominating type (for example, the one with the highest fitness at the end of the simulation), and identifying its ancestor, then the ancestor's ancestor and so forth, arriving finally to the type used to seed the simulation. As there is no sexual recombination between strategies, each population has a single LOD after moving past the most recent common ancestor of the population. The LOD recapitulates the evolutionary history of that particular simulation, as it contains the sequence of mutations that gave rise to the successful strategy at the end of the run (see, for example [53, 54] ).
Conclusions
While evolutionary games can be described succinctly in mathematical terms, they can only be solved exactly for the simplest of cases. Approximate methods exist to deal with finite population sizes and (very small) mutation rates, but the general case of stochastic and conditional strategies evolving at realistic mutation rates in finite populations (possibly on a grid or a network) can only be solved by explicitly simulating the population dynamics, and letting the agents "play it out", so to speak. In such realistic settings we find that the outcome of a competition might depend on the particular parameters of the simulation, that then take on the role of "environmental" parameters. For example, the fraction of the population that is replaced per update determines the average number of iterated games the agent plays. If agents communicate with each other (using strategies where the move is conditional on one or more previous plays), the mutation rate creates noise in the communication channel (because either of the strategies playing each other may suddenly change). Because the reliability of communication is essential in cooperation, both an increased mutation rate and an increased replacement rate make cooperation less likely [36] .
We thus have to conclude that the limit where mathematical solutions are feasible represents rather unrealistic environments (such as infinite population size, vanishing mutation rate, perfectly mixed population), that cannot capture the complexity of stochastic and conditional play. However, mathematical solutions (even if they are only approximations) still play an essential role in evolutionary game theory, because they describe the limiting cases of agent-based methods, which must be explored in order to validate the simulations. In a well-developed simulation framework the limiting cases should be checked often so as to ensure that the dynamics are well understood. Properly used, agent-based simulations can go where mathematics cannot [18] , but they should be treated like computational experiments, whose significance must be judged in the light of judiciously designed controls.
